MOME in Hindsight by Gilson, Ronald J. & Kraakman, Reinier
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2005 
MOME in Hindsight 
Ronald J. Gilson 
Columbia Law School, rgilson@law.columbia.edu 
Reinier Kraakman 
kraakman@law.harvard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, MOME in Hindsight, REGULATION, VOL. 27, NO. 4, P. 64, 2004-2005 
(2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1351 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
wo decades ago, the Virginia Law Review
published our article “The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency” (mome), in which we
tried to discern the institutional under-
pinnings of financial market efficiency. We
concluded that the level of market effi-
ciency with respect to a particular fact
depends on which of several market mechanisms — univer-
sally informed trading, professionally informed trading, deriv-
atively informed trading, and uninformed trading (each of
which we explain below) — operates to reflect that fact in mar-
ket price. Which mechanism is operative, in turn, depends on
how widely the fact is distributed among traders, which, in
turn, depends on the cost structure of the market for infor-
mation. Less costly information is distributed more widely,
triggers a more effective efficiency mechanism, and is reflect-
ed more efficiently by market prices.
Revisiting our article is particularly appropriate today. A
new framework for evaluating the efficiency of the stock mar-
ket called “behavioral finance” and a growing number of empir-
ical studies pose a serious challenge to the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis. Michael Jensen’s 1978 statement that “there is no
proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evi-
dence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis” is
now proffered with a tone somewhere between irony and con-
descension.
The movement away from Jensen over the past few decades
surely merits a reconsideration of the substance and policy impli-
cations of financial market efficiency. We remain convinced that
the quickness and accuracy with which the stock market reflects
information in the price of a security is a function of the per-
formance of institutions. Twenty years, however, have made us
appropriately more skeptical of the efficiency of those institutions.
Ronald J. Gilson is the Meyers Professor of Law and Business at Stanford Law School
and the Stern Professor of Law and Business at Columbia Law School.
Reinier Kraakman is the Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
This article is based on a longer paper that appeared in the 2003 Journal of Corporate Law.
T H E  R I S E  O F  M O D E R N  F I N A N C E
To place mome in its proper context, we first need a capsule
account of the development of modern finance. We will focus
on three bodies of theory that sought to state rigorously how
capital assets are priced, whether a corporation’s choice of debt
and equity financing instruments affects its value, and whether
the market price of freely traded securities reflects all available
information concerning their value.
Those three familiar theories — the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propositions, and the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis — share an extensive set
of perfect markets assumptions: rational investors, perfect
information, and no transaction costs.
Start with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (capm). If one
assumes that all unsystematic risk (risks that affect some assets
but not others in the economy) can be eliminated through own-
ership of a diversified portfolio of investments, what else but
systematic risk (risks that affect all assets simultaneously) could
affect the price of capital assets? If investors need not bear
unsystematic risk because they are diversified, then investors
who do not bear it will require the lowest return (pay the high-
est price) for a capital asset, thereby setting the asset’s price.
capm simply takes the next step and argues that the system-
atic risk that matters to investors is the covariance of an asset’s
returns with those of the market — i.e., beta. Given those
assumptions, capm is a tautology.
The Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propositions share the
same conceptual structure. Like capm, the perfect capital mar-
ket assumptions result in the Irrelevance Propositions appear-
ing tautological. If debt or equity was mispriced, arbitrage
would restore the proper relation so that increasing the amount
of lower-cost debt would result in an offsetting increase in the
cost of equity, and vice versa.
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ecmh) also builds
on perfect market assumptions. As William Sharpe wrote,
“Simply put, the thesis is this: that in a well-functioning secu-
rities market, the prices . . . of securities will reflect predictions
based on all relevant and available information. This seems to
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be trivially self-evident to most professional economists — so
much so that testing seems almost silly.” 
In addition to its prediction of the information content of stock
prices, the ecmh also played a critical integrative role, providing
the necessary link between asset pricing and capital structure
choice through the medium of market prices. Both capmand the
Modigliani-Miller propositions depend on an arbitrage mecha-
nism for their proof: mispricing will be traded away. But for arbi-
trage to be triggered by mispricing, market prices must be rea-
sonably informative. Thus, along this important dimension, the
positive powers of the three theories rise and fall together.
T H E  M O M E  T H E S I S
Financial market efficiency, as we saw it, concerned how rap-
idly prices responded to information. By the early 1980s, a large
body of empirical work demonstrated that price responded
extremely rapidly to public and even “semi-public” information
— too rapidly to permit arbitrage profits on most of that infor-
mation. But how was this possible, given that most traders
were likely to be uninformed about the content of much of
this information?
We answered that question on two levels. On the level of the
capital markets, mome proposed that four mechanisms work to
incorporate information in market prices with progressively
decreasing relative efficiency. In “universally informed trading,”
market prices immediately reflect information that all traders
know simply because that information necessarily informs all
trades, just as perfect market theorists assumed. In “profession-
ally informed trading,” information that is less widely known but
nonetheless public is incorporated into share prices almost as rap-
idly as information known to everyone through the trading of
savvy professionals. In “derivatively informed trading,” inside
information known to only a very few traders would find its way
into prices more slowly, as uninformed traders learned about its
content by observing tell-tale shifts in the activity of presump-
tively informed traders or unusual price and volume movements.
Finally, in “uninformed trading,” information known to no one
might be reflected, albeit slowly and imperfectly, in share prices
that aggregate the forecasts of numerous market participants with
heterogeneous information.
mome’s second claim was that cost determines the distri-
bution of information in the market. The cost of information,
in turn, depends on the market institutions that produce, ver-
ify, and analyze information — institutions that range from the
Wall Street Journal to the exhaustive research of the best profes-
sional investors.
T H E  C H A L L E N G E  O F  B E H AV I O R A L  F I N A N C E
Beginning in the 1980s, a growing literature challenged the
empirical predictions of the 1960s’ perfect market theorems.
That challenge, in turn, gave rise to a reassessment of the under-
lying theory of perfect markets.
EMPIRICAL ANOMOLIES A focus on imperfections in the mar-
ket for information sparked a series of explanations of how cap-
ital structure (debt vs. equity) could matter if information was
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had private information concerning the corporation’s future
prospects, and if bankruptcy is costly to managers, then expos-
ing the corporation to a greater risk of bankruptcy either by pay-
ing dividends or maintaining a higher debt-to-equity ratio could
credibly signal that information to the market and thereby influ-
ence the price of the corporation’s securities. Correspondingly,
capital structure could also function as an incentive: an increased
risk of bankruptcy resulting from a more leveraged capital struc-
ture could provide an incentive for managers (for whom bank-
ruptcy would be costly) to work even harder.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model always had problems when
attention shifted from theory to empirical testing. A security’s
beta does not predict its return very well, as two categories of
evidence demonstrate.  First, studies show that asset-pricing
models with multiple factors in addition to systematic risk do
a better job of predicting prices than capm does alone. Eugene
Fama and Kenneth French, for example, found that they could
better predict market prices with a three-factor pricing model
that includes company size and book-to-market ratio in addi-
tion to systematic risk.
Second, capm’s empirical failures exhibit certain regular-
ities. The literature identifies a number of what are styled
“anomalies” — that is, persistent evidence of higher-than-
predicted returns based on publicly available information. Such
anomalies include the tendency of small companies to earn
higher-than-predicted returns, the seeming existence of a “Jan-
uary effect” (in which much of the abnormal returns to small-
er firms occurs during the first half of January), the “weekend
effect” (in which stock returns are predictably negative over
weekends), and the “value effect” (in which firms with high
earnings-to-price ratios, high dividend yields, or high book-to-
market ratios earn higher-than-predicted returns). 
Various explanations have been offered for the empirical dis-
crepancies. Some commentators attribute them to incorrect
asset pricing models. Others note that the studies revealing the
anomalies are sensitive to the particular empirical techniques
used, or demonstrate that at least some of the anomalies dis-
appear or are dramatically reduced in size following their
announcement in the literature, thus suggesting that markets
learn, although not necessarily quickly.
Nevertheless, the accumulation of anomalies has had an
effect, despite efforts to explain those anomalies in finance-
friendly ways. The core theories of modern finance assume that
investors are fully rational (or that the market acts as if they are)
and that markets are efficient and transaction costs small, so
that professionally informed traders quickly notice and take
advantage of mispricing, thereby driving prices back to their
proper level. Behavioral finance generalizes from the accretion
of empirical discrepancies to argue that many investors are not
rational in their financial decision-making, that there are
observable directional biases resulting from departures from
rational decision-making, and that significant barriers prevent
professional traders from fully correcting the mistakes made
by less-than-rational investors.
COGNITIVE BIASES The criticism of the rationality premise
builds on an important literature that uses decision-making
experiments to show how individuals’ cognitive biases can lead
them to systematically misassess an asset’s value. The list of
biases has grown impressively with time and includes over-
confidence (the tendency of individuals to overestimate their
skills), the endowment effect (the tendency of individuals to
insist on a higher price to sell something they already own than
to buy the same item if they do not already own it), loss aver-
sion (the tendency for people to be risk averse for profit oppor-
tunities but willing to gamble to avoid a loss), anchoring (the
tendency for people to make decisions based on an initial esti-
mate that is later adjusted but not sufficiently to eliminate the
influence of the initial estimate), framing (the tendency of peo-
ple to make different choices based on how the decision is
framed, such as whether it is framed in terms of the likelihood
of a good outcome or in terms of the reciprocal likelihood of
a bad outcome), and hindsight (the tendency of people to read
the present into assessments of the past).
Individuals whose decisions are subject to one or more of
those biases, referred to in the literature as “noise traders,” make
investment decisions that deviate from those that theory would
predict of rational investors. Charles Lee, Andrei Shliefer, and
Richard Thaler, in a 1991 Journal of Finance article, argued that
the discount often associated with closed-end mutual funds,
one of the longstanding phenomena that conflict with the
ecmh, illustrates the potential for misguided investors to influ-
ence price efficiency. When an investor sells shares in a closed-
end mutual fund, she receives whatever a buyer is willing to pay
rather than a proportionate share of the fund’s net asset value
(as she would if she redeemed her interest in an open-end
mutual fund). Because the net assets of a closed-end fund are
observable, the ecmh predicts that the fund’s stock price
should reflect its net asset value. In fact, closed-end funds sys-
tematically (but not uniformly) trade at a discount from their
underlying asset value, a serious problem for the claim that
stock prices generally are the best estimate of a security’s value.
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Behavioral finance argues that significant barriers
prevent professional traders from fully correcting the
mistakes made by less-than-rational investors.
In the one case where we can actually observe underlying asset
value, stock price diverges from it.
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler blame the divergence on noise
traders, whose views about value — perhaps because of some
or all of the cognitive biases reviewed above — plainly ignore
the value of securities held by closed-end funds, as they are
reflected in market prices. But two other elements are also nec-
essary. First, the biases held by the noise traders must be more
or less consistent; otherwise, at least some of the biases will
regress out. Second, arbitrageurs must be unwilling to police
the resulting price inaccuracies. Under perfect capital market
assumptions, fully informed traders with unlimited access to
capital immediately pounce on mispriced securities. If arbi-
trageurs were available to trade against the noise traders, then
their action would suffice to return prices to their efficient level.
In the case of closed-end mutual funds, however, the absence
of institutional investors in this niche limits the extent of cor-
rective arbitrage, and prices retain a rational component reflect-
ing the risk of noise trader irrationality.
LIMITS ON ARBITRAGE Limited arbitrage is critical to the
behavioral finance perspective, and the problem is more gen-
eral than the simple case of closed-end mutual funds. Limits
on arbitrage fall into four general categories: 
 fundamental risk; 
 noise trader risk; 
 institutional limits, both regulatory and incentive; 
and 
 the potential that even professional traders may be 
subject to cognitive biases.
The problem of fundamental risk arises because the arbi-
trageur, unless hedged, has a position in the stock of a particu-
lar company that is exposed to loss from a change in the com-
pany’s fortunes. That risk can be counterbalanced by holding
an offsetting position in a substitute security. However, substi-
tutes may not be available, and in all events will be imperfect.
Imagine an arbitrageur who believes that Ford is underpriced.
For example, suppose an arbitrageur shorts General Motors to
hedge the risk associated with purchasing Ford.  This strategy
works, but it only hedges against bad news in the automobile
industry generally; it does not hedge against firm-specific bad
news about Ford (and, to the extent that bad news for Ford is
good news for General Motors, it may actually increase the
arbitrageur’s firm-specific risk). The arbitrageur must there-
fore expect a higher return to offset the risk that she cannot lay
off, which in turn reduces arbitrage activity and lowers market
efficiency. The result is much like Sanford Grossman and
Joseph Stiglitz’s now familiar point that informationally effi-
cient markets are impossible because full efficiency eliminates
the returns to the very activity that makes the market efficient,
with the result of an “equilibrium degree of disequilibrium.”
Noise trader risk similarly reduces arbitrage effectiveness
because arbitrageurs bear the risk that noise traders will con-
tinue to be irrational, therefore maintaining, or even increas-
ing, the mispricing. Because the arbitrageur will also have to be
compensated for the risk that noise traders’ continued confu-
sion will adversely affect the value of her rational bets, the
required return goes up and level of activity goes down, result-
ing in a cost-driven level of market inefficiency.
Institutional limits on arbitrage prevent arbitrageurs from
trading away information inefficiencies that result not from
market risk, but from the structure of the institutions through
which the arbitrageurs act. For our purposes, those limits fall
into two categories: regulatory and market constraints on the
mechanisms of arbitrage, and the structure of arbitrageurs’
incentives. Each category operates to restrict the extent to
which arbitrage can correct mispricing.
Regulatory restrictions on arbitrage are directed at short
sales, undertaken by an arbitrageur when she believes the mar-
ket price of a security is higher than its efficient price. In a short
sale, the arbitrageur sells a security she does not own. To
accomplish that, she must first find an existing owner of the
overpriced security who is willing to lend the security to the
arbitrageur. The borrowed stock is then sold, the arbitrageur
betting that the price of the security will fall before the securi-
ty must be purchased to repay the loan. 
Securities Exchange Act rules 10a-1 and 10a-2 provide the
basic regulatory framework. Rule 10a-1, the “uptick test,” gen-
erally prohibits a short sale at a price below the security’s last
reported price, and Rule 10a-2 restricts activities by broker-deal-
ers that could facilitate a violation of the uptick test. The idea
behind those Depression-era prohibitions is to prevent “specu-
lators” from driving down the price of a stock by selling it at
prices below those that would prevail if all sales were “long” sales,
i.e., sales made by traders who actually held the stock. The dif-
ficulty with the rule is simply the obverse of its asserted benefit.
The clientele of long traders who hold a stock are self-selected
optimists. Short selling, through its information-revealing prop-
erties, pushes stock prices to a lower, more efficient level; to the
extent that the uptick rule actually succeeds in restricting arbi-
trage, the level of market efficiency suffers. 
There is good news here. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission recently announced an ambitious experiment to test
the effects of liberalizing the short-selling regulations. Over the
coming months, the sec will permit a large sample of stocks
to be sold short, while its analysts gather data on how that prac-
tice affects the market without an uptick test.
Market restrictions on short selling involve limits on both
the demand side and the supply side — the costs and avail-
ability of shares to borrow to affect a short sale. While Secu-
rities Exchange Act Section 316(c) restricts short selling by offi-
cers, directors, and large shareholders of publicly traded
companies, the more serious demand constraint is voluntary;
a recent sec study reports that only some 43 percent of mutu-
al funds are authorized by their charters to sell short. During
the six-month period ending April 30, 2003, only about 2.5
percent of registered investment companies (236 out of some
9,000) actually engaged in short selling. Because 79 percent of
mutual funds report that they do not use derivatives, it is
unlikely that the charter restrictions are being avoided through
the use of synthetic securities.
Market restrictions on the supply side relate to the lending
market for the securities that must be borrowed in order to make
a short sale.  Preparation for a short sale begins with a request
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that the arbitrageur’s broker find a lender for the shares that are
to be sold. The universe for potential lenders includes the bro-
ker itself (if it has an inventory of the desired stock) or institu-
tional investors (including pension funds, insurance companies,
and index funds, all of whom have long-term strategies that are
unlikely to be negatively affected by liquidity constraints result-
ing from securities lending). The arbitrageur transfers collater-
al (typically cash) to the lender in the amount of 102 percent of
the value of the borrowed securities. The lender then pays inter-
est to the arbitrageur on the cash collateral, termed the rebate
rate, and has the right to call in the loan at any time. If the loan
is called at a time when the shares have risen in value, the arbi-
trageur will be forced to close her position at a loss unless anoth-
er lender is found. Additionally, sec Regulation T requires that
the arbitrageur post a margin of 50 percent of the borrowed secu-
rities’ value in additional collateral.
In general, the lending market available to short sellers for
large-issuer securities is broad and deep. Large-cap stocks usu-
ally are easy and cheap to borrow, with the great majority
requiring loan fees of less than one percent per year. In contrast,
borrowing small-cap stocks with little institutional ownership
may be difficult and expensive. As much as 16 percent of the
stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices file may be
impossible to borrow.
Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests, however,
that it becomes more costly to borrow a stock as the divergence
of opinion about the security’s value increases. The logic
reflects the fact that those who do not lend the security forgo
the price they would have received for its loan. Thus, those
holding a stock must value it more highly than those who lend
it by an amount in excess of the loan fee. The greater the diver-
gence of opinion concerning the stock’s value, the higher the
loan fees, yielding the perverse result that the transaction costs
of arbitrage increase in precisely the circumstance when the
activity is most important.
Consistent with significant market limits on arbitrage, short
interest in securities is generally quite small. A recent study
reports that over the period 1976–1993, more than 80 percent
of listed firms had short interests of less than 0.5 percent of out-
standing shares, and more than 98 percent had short interests
of less than 5 percent, a level consistent in magnitude with ear-
lier assessments. And as one might expect from strong limits
on arbitrage, the empirical evidence “is broadly consistent with
the idea that short-sale constraints matter for equilibrium stock
prices and expected returns.”
The problem, however, is with the magnitude of the costs.
If all but small, non-institutional stock is readily available for
borrowing, the regulatory and market-imposed transaction
costs of short-selling seem too small to account for the limit-
ed amount of short-selling we observe and for its impact on
pricing. A recent study by Joseph Chen, Harrison Hong, and
Jeremy Stein of the impact of short selling constraints con-
cluded that “an interesting question that our work raises, but
does not answer, is this: why do short-sale constraints seem to
be so strongly binding? Or said slightly differently: why, in spite
of the high apparent risk-adjusted returns to strategies involv-
ing shorting, is there so little aggregate short interest in virtu-
ally all stocks? . . . We are skeptical that all, or even most, of the
answer has to do with . . . specific transaction costs.” 
The structure of arbitrageurs’ incentives may provide the
identity of the dark matter of the short sale universe — the
source of constraints that the transaction costs of short selling
do not explain. Recent work highlights a number of incentive
problems, including a more realistic account of arbitrageurs’
goals and the agency costs of arbitrage. 
The first problem is that we have treated arbitrageurs as a
kind of market maker whose role is to police the efficiency of
prices and whose efforts will be compromised to the extent that
regulatory and transaction costs make short-selling costly. In
fact, however, arbitrageurs have a quite different goal: to make
money. That, in turn, suggests that arbitrageurs act not only on
a difference between a stock’s market price and its fundamen-
tal value, but also on a difference between a stock’s current mar-
ket price and its future market price regardless of the relation
between its future market price and its fundamental value.
If overly optimistic noise traders are in the market, shorting
the stock is not the only way to make money. Instead, one can
profit by anticipating the direction of the noise traders’ valua-
tion error, and taking advantage of that error through long, not
short, positions with the goal of selling the shares to noise
traders at a higher future price. The result may be to drive up
the price of already overvalued stocks, and to prolong the
length and increase the extent of bubbles.
The second problem is the agency costs of arbitrage. Keep
in mind that arbitrage positions are made based on ex ante
expectations, but the gain realized depends on ex post out-
comes. The two may differ because of either the arbitrageurs’
skill in identifying mispricing or because of fundamental or
noise trader risk; that is, an investment may fail either because
of bad judgment or because of bad luck.
For an arbitrageur trading for her own account, we can pre-
sume the explanation for a failed investment is observable. But
now assume that the arbitrageur is instead an investment pro-
fessional whose capital is raised from institutional investors and
who receives a portion of the profits — the arbitrageur runs a
hedge fund. Because the initial ex ante assessment of the portfolio
investment is not observable to the fund investor, the investor
then may use the investment’s ex post outcome as a proxy of the
arbitrageur’s skill, with the effect of exposing the arbitrageur’s
human capital to both fundamental and noise trader risk
because the fund investor may mistakenly treat a loss that real-
ly results from bad luck as evidence of bad judgment. Arbi-
trageurs thought to have “bad judgment” will have difficulty rais-
ing new funds. That, in turn, will cause the arbitrageur to reduce
her risk by taking more conservative positions; that is, taking
positions more like those of everyone else. Importantly, the per-
sonal risk to the arbitrageur increases as the importance of arbi-
trage as a means to correct market price increases. The greater
the disagreement about a stock’s price, the greater the bad luck
risk that the arbitrage position turns out badly and, hence, the
greater risk to the arbitrageur’s human capital.
This interaction between noise trader risk and the agency
costs of arbitrage can plausibly lead to bubble-like conditions.
Once noise traders enter the market in large numbers, the risk
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to arbitrage increases, which in turn results in an independent
reduction in the level of arbitrage. This reduction, one might
imagine, is more or less linear. More important, the presence of
a market driven by noise traders has the potential to create a
kink in the arbitrage supply curve, when the potential profits
from momentum trading exceed the potential profits from
short selling. From this perspective, one might consider a sharp
increase in the number of individual investors in the market as
a pre-bust signal of a bubble. That assessment turns on its head
the familiar anecdotal observation that when individuals get
into the market, the professionals get out: when individuals
enter the market in large numbers, professionals find something
to sell them. 
A final potential limit on arbitrage looks back to the psy-
chological biases that may underlie the noise trader phenome-
non. To this point, we have treated arbitrageurs as if they still
met the perfect rationality assumption of traditional theory —
even if they are responding to the presence of noise traders or
frictions in the incentive structure they face, they do so ration-
ally. However, even professional traders are people. Maybe they
are subject to cognitive biases as well; that is, the existence of
irrational professional traders may be a limit to arbitrage.
The issue of whether some or all of the cognitive biases are
hardwired or can be diminished by education or experience is
a contested subject whose review is far beyond our ambition
here. We note only that when the studies place individuals in
a position where the goal is to make money, the cognitive bias-
es seem to disappear quickly. And because the organization has
the capacity to shape the traders’ incentives so that the goal is
clear, the potential for learning to occur and be reinforced is sig-
nificant. Thus, we will treat professional traders as rational
actors in responding to the incentives that they face.
A  T E N TAT I V E  A S S E S S M E N T  O F  
T H E  B E H AV I O R A L  F I N A N C E  P R I N C I P L E S
Despite the body of experimental evidence supporting per-
sistent decision-making biases in some portion of the popu-
lation, we are skeptical that this phenomenon will be found
generally to play a significant role in setting aggregate price lev-
els because the biases of different individuals to some impor-
tant extent offset each other. Investor irrationality should be a
matter of real concern when a single bias affects most noise
traders, leaving a much heavier burden on arbitrage. And the
problem will increase more than monotonically as the num-
ber of infected noise traders increases. As the volume of irra-
tional trades increases, a point is reached at which arbitrageurs’
most profitable strategy shifts from betting against the noise
traders to buying in front of them, with the goal of exploiting
the noise traders’ mistake by selling overvalued stock to them.
A sharp increase in the participation of individual
investors is a powerful indication that they share a common
bias — the likelihood that a coincidence of different biases
all leading to increasing participation at the same time seems
small. Thus, a spike in individual trading — Lee, Shleifer, and
Thaler’s proxy for noise trading — may serve as a limited pre-
dictor of price bubbles. On those occasions, arbitrage con-
straints on price are relaxed and the effects of cognitive bias-
es on prices are likely to be of significantly greater magnitude
than cost-based deviations from perfect market conditions. 
Except for those situations in which the interactions of noise
traders and market professionals create bubbles, the behavioral
finance bias literature will have its greatest impact on circum-
stances when the concern is not with aggregate price effects, but
with the behavior of individual investors. We may care a great deal
if individuals systematically make poor investment decisions with
respect to their retirement savings, especially with the growing
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans,
even if their mistakes do not affect price levels at all.
In contrast to our skepticism that cognitive biases affect
market efficiency only episodically (when the number of indi-
vidual investors spikes and their biases therefore likely coin-
cide), we are quite sympathetic to concerns that agency and
incentive problems constrain the professionally informed trad-
ing mechanism continuously, even in times of normal trading.
mome’s relative efficiency concept, following Grossman and
Stiglitz, builds on the idea that the cost of information limits
the effectiveness of professionally informed trading — it has
to pay to be informed. Agency and incentive problems
between, for example, hedge funds and their investors and
between hedge funds and their portfolio managers pose the
same kind of tradeoff — it has to pay to reduce those costs.
M O M E  A N D  B E H AV I O R A L  F I N A N C E
How well does mome’s focus on the distribution and cost of
information stand up to behavioral finance today? The answer,
we believe, is mixed. The good news is that the central cate-
gories of mome, including the market mechanisms and the
concept of relative efficiency, are consistent not only with the
established empirical findings of behavioral finance but with
some of its more promising models as well. The bad news is
that back in the early 1980s, we greatly underestimated the
institutional obstacles to the production and rapid reflection
of information in share prices. 
THE GOOD NEWS The good news about mome extends to both
fact and theory. On the empirical side, proponents of both ration-
al markets and behavioral finance agree that many of the long-
term pricing anomalies that cut against the efficiency of market
prices largely disappear when analysts control for company size.
Disappearing anomalies include, for example, the underpricing
of initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings. The size-
related character of those anomalies is good news because it is pre-
cisely what momewould predict on the assumption that the size
of the float is a critical determinant of the amount and quality of
information about issuers and the relative efficiency with which
that information is reflected in market prices. The reasoning is
simple. Small issuers have a limited following among analysts and
other professional investors, in part because there is little profit
in researching issuers whose size restricts the potential gains. As
a result, less information is produced, verification of information
is more costly, and net returns available to investors and securi-
ties traders are correspondingly lower.
Size, analyst coverage, and the attendant availability can
account for pricing anomalies of other sorts as well. On the the-
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ory side, an important model developed by Harrison Hong and
Jeremy Stein explains momentum trading and skewness in
stock prices on the basis of the slow diffusion of private infor-
mation through the economy. Traders without access to pri-
vate information rationally treat price movements as a proxy
for the injection of new information, which explains momen-
tum trading as well as sudden reversals in price when traders
discover they have already overshot share value. In support of
this model, Hong, Stein, and Terence Lim present evidence that
momentum trading in shares is particularly strong among
small firms and firms that attract little interest among analysts. 
THE BAD NEWS If recent models of the production and dif-
fusion of information confirm the continuing relevance of
mome’s analysis, our original account of market mechanisms
and the institutional production of information suffered from
what might be termed “naiveté bias.” For example, we implic-
itly underestimated the institutional complexities that attend
the production, processing, and verification of market infor-
mation, as well as its reflection in share prices. Some aspects
of our naiveté were discussed earlier in this essay: in particu-
lar, the legal and institutional limitations on arbitrage, includ-
ing the agency problems that afflict institutional investors —
such as the role of incentive structures in encouraging herding
behavior by fund managers at the expense of fund investors.
But even more important than underestimating the limits
on the arbitrage mechanism, we failed to appreciate the mag-
nitude of the incentive problems in the core market institu-
tions that produce, verify, and process information about cor-
porate issuers. As the Enron cohort of financial scandals
demonstrated, lucrative equity compensation has had the side
effect of creating powerful incentives for managers to increase
share prices. We suppose that managers usually respond by
creating additional value for shareholders. But sometimes they
respond by feeding distorted information to the market — or
even by lying outright, as in such recent cases as WorldCom
and HealthSouth. Recent scandals also demonstrate that we
also were too sanguine about the role of the institutions that
we termed “reputational intermediaries” — the established
investment banks, commercial banks, accounting firms, and
law firms that use their reputations to vouch for the repre-
sentations of unknown issuers, and so reduce the information
costs of investors. Finally, we were naïve about the role of secu-
rity analysts, and particularly those employed by the invest-
ment banks on the “sell side” of the market. Those analysts, it
appears, often acted as selling agents for the client-issuers of
the institutions that employ them. Or, put differently, an
investment bank’s reputation among issuers is likely to mat-
ter more to it than its reputation among the lay investors who
rely on its analysts’ reports. 
In sum, on every dimension of information costs — the
costs of producing, verifying, and processing valuation data —
we confess error, not about the roles of the institutions that sup-
ply information to the market, but about how well they per-
form their roles. The point is perhaps too obvious today to
merit elaboration, but the market cannot be more efficient than
the institutions that fix quality and cost of valuation informa-
tion permit it to be. That, after all, was mome’s principal point.
P O L I C Y  I M P L I C AT I O N S
We have argued that the binding constraints on market efficien-
cy arise either from institutional limitations or the interaction of
the arbitrage mechanism with cognitive biases — not from the
widespread existence of cognitive biases alone. There are impli-
cations of this view for the formulation of regulatory policy. 
BEHAVIOR FINANCE CAN GUIDE REFORM We see two prin-
cipal areas where behavioral finance is likely to have policy
implications in the near term. One lies on the institutional side.
Given the importance of limitations on the arbitrage mecha-
nism that we have emphasized thus far, regulators should clear-
ly seek to reduce legal and institutional barriers to arbitrage.
Thus, the sec should continue to explore removing the uptick
rule and margin requirements that burden short selling, as well
as campaigning against the lingering taint that makes institu-
tional investors such as mutual funds reluctant to pursue short-
selling strategies. Far from being suspect, short selling actual-
ly confers a positive externality on the entire market by speeding
the reflection of unfavorable information in share prices. In
addition, behavioral finance may support temporary interven-
tions in the market, such as trading halts, when market behav-
ior suggests a surge of biased trading that threatens to destabi-
lize arbitrage. We hesitate to make this prediction too forcefully,
however, as there is still much work to be done in parsing out
the psychological and institutional roots of market frenzies.
We are far more confident about a second area in which
behavioral finance might eventually inform regulatory policy:
the protection of individual investors. The possible conse-
quences for policy involve paternalistic responses to cognitive
bias. As we argued above, three conditions must be met for
psychological distortions to affect share prices: 
 cognitive biases must be pervasive (as most com-
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The market cannot be more efficient than the
institutions that fix quality and cost of valuation
permit it to be.
mentators believe they are); 
 they must be correlated (because they would other-
wise be offsetting); and, 
 the arbitrage mechanism must fail with respect to 
their effects. 
Notice, however, that cognitive bias can injure investors
even if it has no effect whatsoever on share prices, i.e., the sec-
ond and third conditions above are not met.   Perhaps the best
example is the employee who, as a result of limited knowledge
or cognitive bias, misallocates investment in a 401(k) plan by
failing to diversify her investments, or assumes a level of risk
inappropriate to her age and retirement aspirations.
The rise of defined contribution and voluntary investment
plans has shifted discretion over retirement savings from pro-
fessional traders to individual “lay” investors who often are noise
traders. It might well be, then, that we would be wise to limit the
investment discretion of employee-investors, precisely in order
to prevent them from harming themselves. Such limitations
might be mandatory for government-sponsored or tax-favored
retirement plans: for example, an inflexible diversification
requirement. Alternatively, the limitations might take the form
of what has been termed “asymmetric paternalism,” i.e., default
rules that sophisticated investors can avoid but that are binding
on unsophisticated investors who are more likely to make cost-
ly errors as a result of cognitive bias or bounded rationality. 
THE TAKEOVER DEBATE Once we leave the easy cases of short-
selling restrictions, obvious market frenzies, and undiversified
retirement savings, the legal implications of behavioral finance
for corporate and securities law become much murkier for the
simple reason that we know little about both the extent and
nature of cognitive bias among traders or the interaction of cog-
nitive bias with the institutions that generate information and the
mechanisms that reflect it in price (including, above all, the arbi-
trage activity of sophisticated investors). We therefore find our-
selves largely in agreement with Donald Langevoort’s assessment
of the implications of behavioral finance for securities regulation,
which, no doubt over-simplifying, we would summarize as, “not
much so far, although lawmakers should stay tuned to current
research and keep an open mind.” Indeed, we would go one step
further to caution against the use of behavioral finance to
advance policy agendas that it cannot possibly support. We close
this essay with the cautionary example of a policy debate in
which behavioral finance is sometimes said to have important
implications when in fact it does not.
The example we have in mind is the claim that is sometimes
made in debates over takeovers that investor irrationality
demonstrates the wisdom of vesting discretion over the deci-
sion to defend against hostile takeovers in the hands of man-
agers rather than shareholders. 
We find this claim unpersuasive for several reasons that
nicely illustrate the limits of cognitive psychology in setting
basic corporate policy. In the first place, market efficiency has
a limited role in the takeover debate. The primary policy trade-
off is between the absence of strong-form efficiency (i.e., the
possibility that managers have information about the corpo-
ration’s value that the market lacks, which is the reason for giv-
ing management discretion to defend) and the possibility of
managerial agency cost (i.e., the reason for giving the decision
to shareholders). This one comes out in favor of shareholder
decision-making because target management can always ame-
liorate the failure of strong-form efficiency by disclosing its
information if takeover decision-making is allocated to share-
holders, while allocating authority to management does noth-
ing to ameliorate the agency cost problem.
It is at this point that the cognitive bias component of behav-
ioral finance comes into play: The balance may shift if, despite dis-
closure, shareholders will predictably reject target managers’
advice because of one or another cognitive bias. Of course, given
the range of cognitive biases, one cannot entirely reject this pos-
sibility. Some biases predict that shareholders will tender too read-
ily while others predict an unwarranted reluctance to tender. In
the context of the allocation of takeover decision-making
between managers and shareholders, the critical point is that cog-
nitive bias analysis be applied on a bilateral or comparative basis.
This concern grows out of the fact that the experimental lit-
erature is largely unilateral in its focus. The experiments are con-
cerned only with whether a particular decision-maker is subject
to a cognitive bias, not whether one competing decision-maker
is more impaired than another. But when cognitive bias is invoked
to allocate authority among competing decision-makers, the
analysis must be bilateral: the potential biases of the decision-
makers must be compared. The question is whether managers or
shareholders’ decisions are likely to be more distorted.
The comparison seems to us to favor allocating decision-mak-
ing authority to shareholders. First, it is simply unclear which, if
any, biases are likely to apply to individual shareholders when they
must choose whether to accept a hostile offer. Moreover, the out-
come of the takeover is likely to be determined by the decisions
of institutional investors, who are less likely to be subject to cog-
nitive biases (but may be subject to institutional influences) — the
shareholders critical to the outcome of a hostile takeover look lit-
tle like the noise trader clientele of closed-end mutual funds. Final-
ly, the market for corporate control operates to an extent as a
backstop in case cognitive biases cause target shareholders to ten-
der into too low an offer. The ubiquity of competing bidders
emerging in response to an underpriced offer can save the share-
holders from their biases.
On the other side, one can imagine a range of biases that
may influence target managers to resist a hostile takeover even
when the transaction is in the shareholders’ best interests. A
reaction to cognitive dissonance may cause managers to
respond to an offer that calls into question their performance
and competence by deriding the bidder’s motives and prom-
ising a brighter future if only the shareholders have patience.
Managers may genuinely believe their claims, but behavioral
finance suggests that their assessment may be driven by a cog-
nitive bias. This effort at dissonance reduction may, in turn, be
exacerbated by the overconfidence bias — managers’ vigorous
defense may be encouraged by a biased assessment of their own
skills. Other examples are possible, but the point by now
should be clear: When cognitive bias analysis is invoked to illu-
minate the choice between two decision-makers, its applica-
tion must be bilateral.
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We conclude that the cognitive bias element of behavioral
finance is unlikely to change the tradeoff between agency costs
ands strong-form market inefficiency that we believe supports
allocating to shareholders the choice of whether a hostile
takeover goes forward. To be sure, by highlighting the possi-
bility of good faith but systematically misguided defensive
action, the cognitive bias analysis does serve to give richness
to the explanation for target managers’ behavior that agency
theory’s simple self-interest paradigm lacks. But this useful
insight reinforces, rather than undercuts, an allocation of deci-
sion-making authority to shareholders.
C O N C L U S I O N
So where does our retrospective leave us? Twenty years further,
we think, along the road leading from elegant models of the
workings of the capital market in a frictionless world, to an
understanding of how the market operates in a world where
information is costly and unevenly distributed, agents are self-
interested, transactions costs are pervasive, and noise traders
are common. The nature of this more realistic understanding
is beginning to take shape, and it can be described in a single
word: messy. There are a lot more moving parts and, as a result,
a much larger number of interactions to understand. Models
will be necessarily partial, illuminating particular interactions,
but will fall far short (and without the ambition) of a unified
field theory.
That said, we come away with some confidence in a num-
ber of themes, some that were explicit in mome, some that we
missed, and others that reflect an assessment of the likely con-
tribution of cognitive psychology to our understanding of how
the capital market functions.
First, as was explicit in mome, we believe that understand-
ing the structure of institutions is central to understanding the
operation of the capital market. mome’s shortcoming was the
failure to drill deeply enough into the incentive and agency
structure of important market institutions like those through
which arbitrage is carried out. To the large extent that behav-
ioral finance is composed of applying agency, information, and
incentive analysis to capital market institutions, it promises to
deepen our understanding of how the capital market operates
in the real world.
Second, we are skeptical that the new focus on cognitive
biases in the end will explain very much about price formation
except in circumstances in which investor biases both coincide
and give rise to increased participation. Thus, we expect that
this component of behavioral finance will have a limited role
in the market efficiency debate. In contrast, the literature can
be quite important under circumstances in which we care
about the consequences of biased decision-making on the deci-
sion-makers themselves, independent of whether aggregate
price levels are affected. Reform efforts directed at individuals’
decisions with respect to pension investments, as with 401(k),
provide a good example.
Our final theme is one of balance. When cognitive psy-
chology is used to analyze issues relating to the allocation of
decision-making between competing parties, the application
must be bilateral and comparative. It is insufficient merely to
demonstrate that one party may exhibit cognitive biases. Iden-
tifying a bias in one party begins the analysis; it is completed
only when that impairment is compared to those of the other
party. As we suggested in our analysis of the application of cog-
nitive bias analysis to tender offers, the fact that shareholders
may have a bias in deciding whether to tender does not demon-
strate that managers should have the power to block an offer.
Rather, the shareholders’ bias must be compared with those
biases that affect management.
Twenty years after publication, we remain comfortable with
the analytic framework that animates mome. We should have
been more skeptical of market institutions then, but skepticism
grows with age.
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